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JURISDICTION 
Appellate jurisdiction over this case is rested in the Utah 
Court of Appeals, pursuant to Section 78-2a-3(2)(f), Utah Code 
Annotated (herein "U.C.A."). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
Each of the issues being a question of law, the appropriate 
standard of review is de novo review by the Court of Appeals. 
1. Did the trial court correctly take judicial notice 
regarding the location of a numerical address? 
2. Is venue an essential element of the offense and may it 
be established by a preponderance of the evidence? 
3. Did Appellant's failure to object prior to trial waive 
his rights to contest venue? 
4. Does Section 76-1-202(2), U.C.A., conflict with Section 
76-1-501(3), U.C.Ao, and due process requirements concerning proof 
on the issue of venue? 
5. Does Section 76-1-202(1), U.C.A., render Section 
76-1-501(3), U.C.A., unconstitutional as violative of the 
requirement that all facts constituting a crime must be proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt? 
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DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, 
STATUTES, ORDINANCES AND RULES 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 76-1-202(2); 
76-1-202. Venue of actions. 
(2) All objections of improper place of trial are waived by a 
defendant unless made before trial. 
(Full text of Section 76-1-202 attached as Exhibit A. ) 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 76-1-501: 
76-1-501. Presumption of innocence — "Element of the offense" 
defined. 
(1) A defendant in a criminal proceeding is presumed to be 
innocent until each element of the offense charged against him is 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt. In absence of such proof, the 
defendant shall be acquitted. 
(2) As used in this part the words "element of the offense" 
mean: 
(a) The conduct, attendant circumstances, or results of 
conduct proscribed, prohibited, or forbidden in the definition of 
the offense; 
(b) The culpable mental state required. 
(3) The existence of jurisdiction and venue are not elements 
of the offense but shall be established by a preponderance of the 
evidence. 
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 201: 
Rule 201. Judicial notice of adjudicative facts. 
(a) Scope of rule. This rule governs only judicial notice of 
adjudicative facts. 
(b) Kinds of facts. A judicially noticed fact must be one not 
subject to reasonable dispute in that it is either (1) generally 
known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or (2) 
capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources 
whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned. 
(c) When discretionary. A court may take judicial notice, 
whether requested or not. 
(Full text of Rule 201 attached as Exhibit B.) 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
West Valley City accepts Appellant Flower's presentation of 
the nature of the case. 
RELEVANT FACTS 
1. Flower was charged, by citation (R-l) and by Information 
(R-16, 17; Exhibit C), with violating Section 41-6-44, U.C.A., 
"Driving under the influence of alcohol," and Section 41-6-45, 
U.C.A., "Reckless driving." 
2. The Information alleged that both offenses occurred at 
3596 West 3100 South in West Valley City, State of Utah. (R-16, 
17; Exhibit C) 
3. Prior to trial, Flower made no motions or objections 
regarding the venue of the trial. 
4. The matter was heard as a bench trial in the Third 
Circuit Court, West Valley Department, on January 13, 199 3, before 
the Honorable William A. Thorne. (R-5) 
5. Two witnesses were presented by the prosecution — 
Colleen Hansen, a private citizen, and Officer Black, a West Valley 
City Police Department Patrol Officer. The defense presented no 
witnesses. (R-81; Exhibit D) 
6. Neither witness directly testified that the offense of 
driving under the influence occurred within the limits of West 
Valley City. (R-81; Exhibit D) 
7• Witness Hansen testified that the offense occurred at her 
place of employment, which was located at 3596 West 3100 South. 
(R-82; Exhibit D) 
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8. The trial court, based upon the address evidence 
presented by Witness Hansen, took judicial notice at the time of 
the trial that the address of 3596 West 3100 South is located 
within West Valley City. This finding was based upon the following 
findings of the trial court: 
a. The court found that it was familiar with the 
location of the address of 3596 West 3100 South and knew it to be 
within West Valley City limits. (R-82; Exhibit D) 
b. The address is unique, and there is not another 3596 
West 3100 South within Salt Lake County. (R-82; Exhibit D) 
c. The court found that 3596 West 3100 South is not 
located near the border of West Valley City or any other 
jurisdiction; but, rather, is located near the center of West 
Valley City. (R-82; Exhibit D) 
d. The court found the address of 3596 West 3100 South 
to be generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the 
court to be within West Valley City. (R-82; Exhibit D) 
9. At the conclusion of the presentation of evidence and 
arguments, the court found Flower guilty of driving under the 
influence of alcohol and not guilty of reckless driving. (R-74, 
75) 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
POINT 1 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY TOOK JUDICIAL NOTICE 
THAT 3596 WEST 3100 SOUTH IS WITHIN WEST 
VALLEY CITY. 
The trial court correctly took judicial notice at the time of 
trial that the address of 3596 West 3100 South is located within 
West Valley City. Rule 201(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence 
governs the taking of judicial notice. A court is presumed to know 
what is generally known or what a person of ordinary intelligence 
would know. In the instant case, the location of 3596 West 3100 
South is precisely the type of fact the court could take judicial 
notice of. First, its location is generally known within the 
territorial jurisdiction of the trial court. Second, the address 
allows for accurate and ready determination. The rational 
conclusion for the trial court to draw was that the offense was 
committed in the location as alleged in the Information. Several 
other states allow courts to take judicial notice of streets and 
buildings. 
POINT 2 
VENUE IS NOT AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF THE 
OFFENSE AND MAY BE ESTABLISHED BY 
CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE ON A PREPONDERANCE OF 
THE EVIDENCE STANDARD. 
Utah case law and the Criminal Code clearly set forth that 
venue is not an essential element of the offense and must only be 
established by a preponderance of the evidence. Section 
76-1-501(3), U.C.A., clearly states, "The existence of jurisdiction 
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and venue are not elements of the offense but shall be established 
by a preponderance of the evidence." Furthermore, the judicial 
notice taken clearly meets the preponderance of evidence standard. 
POINT 3 
APPELLANT HAS WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO CONTEST 
VENUE, SINCE HE DID NOT OBJECT PRIOR TO TRIAL 
AS REQUIRED BY SECTION 76-1-202(2), U.C.A. 
Appellant Flower has waived his opportunity to contest venue. 
Section 76-1-202(2), U.C.A., clearly states that any objection must 
be made before trial. The Utah Supreme Court has held that even in 
criminal cases a defendant can waive any objection to venue. In 
this case, Flower did not object before trial; therefore, Flower 
cannot be heard to raise the objection on appeal. 
POINT 4 
SECTION 76-1-202(2), U.C.A., DOES NOT CONFLICT 
WITH SECTION 76-1-501(3), U.C.A., OR WITH DUE 
PROCESS REQUIREMENTS CONCERNING PROOF ON THE 
ISSUE OF VENUE. 
Section 76-1-202(2), U.C.A., pertains to procedure; it does 
not pertain to guilt. Venue does not determine guilt; it 
determines the place where the suit may or should be heard and can 
be waived by the defendant if no timely objection is made. Section 
76-1-501(3), U.C.A., states that venue is not an element of 
criminal offenses and that it be established by a preponderance of 
the evidence. 
Section 76-1-202(2), U.C.A., and Section 76-1-501(3), U.C.A., 
clearly do not conflict. Flower's argument is based on the 
incorrect legal principle that the venue statute deals with guilt. 
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POINT 5 
THE VENUE PROVISIONS IN SECTION 76-1-202(1), 
U.C.A., DO NOT RENDER SECTION 76-1-501(3), 
U.C.A., UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS VIOLATIVE OF THE 
REQUIREMENT THAT ALL OF THE FACTS CONSTITUTING 
A CRIME MUST BE PROVED BEYOND A REASONABLE 
DOUBT. 
Section 76-1-202(1), U.C.A., sets forth the procedural rules 
for determining proper venue and does not make venue an element of 
the crime. However, Appellant Flower is forced to argue that the 
intent of the legislature was to make venue an essential element of 
the crime in order to challenge the constitutionality of Sections 
76-1-202(1) and 76-1-501(3), U.C.A. Flower's argument is based on 
unfounded assumptions. Venue is not an element of the offense and 
can be proved by a preponderance of the evidence. Furthermore, 
Section 76-1-202(2), U.C.A,, in no way shifts the burden of proving 
guilt from the prosecution to the defendant. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY TOOK JUDICIAL NOTICE 
THAT 3596 WEST 3100 SOUTH IS WITHIN WEST 
VALLEY CITY. 
The trial court correctly took judicial notice at the time of 
trial that the address of 3596 West 3100 South is located within 
West Valley City, Salt Lake County, Utah. The rule governing 
judicial notice of adjudicated facts is set forth in Rule 201(b) of 
the Utah Rules of Evidence, which states: 
A judicially noticed fact must be one not 
subject to reasonable dispute in that it is 
either (1) generally known within the 
territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or 
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(2) capable of accurate and ready 
determination by resort to sources whose 
accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned. 
Utah R. Evid. 201. A court is presumed to know what is generally 
known or what a person of ordinary intelligence would know. 
In the instant case, the location of 3596 West 3100 South is 
precisely the type of fact that is appropriate for the trial court 
to take judicial notice of. The location is generally known within 
the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court. And the trial 
court found that it was personally familiar with the location (R-
82; Exhibit D) . The court also found the address to be unique 
within Salt Lake County and to be near the center of West Valley 
City, rather than near any border. (R-82; Exhibit D) 
Flower contends that the trial court erred in taking judicial 
notice because there was no direct evidence that the address is in 
Salt Lake County or West Valley City, despite the direct testimony 
that the offense occurred at 3596 West and 3100. (Appellant's 
Brief, p. 7.) However, the trial court does not have to presume 
less than general intelligence, and under the circumstances it 
would have been naive to say that 3596 West and 3100 South is an 
indefinite location not within West Valley City or Salt Lake 
County. 
The Illinois Supreme Court, in People v. Pride, 156 N.E.2d 551 
(111. 1959), addressed the issue upon reviewing a case in which 
testimony was given that a crime was committed at a particular 
address, but in which no direct evidence was given as to the city 
or county. The court noted that when people are referring to a 
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street within the city in which they live, they commonly refer only 
to the street. Conversely, when they are referring to a street in 
a different city, they will also name the city. Specifically, the 
court reasoned: 
Describing a location by street and number is 
so much a part of our every day life that it 
cannot be ignored. A witness's testimony 
should not be considered in a vacuum divorced 
from our general knowledge as to the manner in 
which things are said. And, so, common 
experience dictates that a witness testifying 
in Chicago, when speaking of 8900 S. Anthony 
Avenue, is speaking of 89 00 S. Anthony Avenue 
in Chicago, Cook County, Illinois, although 
there may very well be an 8900 S. Anthony 
Avenue in some city other than Chicago, in 
some county other than Cook and in some state 
other than Illinois, 
Pride, 156 N.E.2d at 554, 555. 
As a result, although there was no direct evidence to 
establish in which city, county, or state the crime occurred, the 
court held the record sufficient to prove venue of the crime. In 
the present case, Witness Hansen testified in West Valley City that 
the offense occurred at her place of employment, which was located 
at 3596 West 3100 South. The rational conclusion for the trial 
court to draw was that the offense was committed in the location 
alleged in the Information. Several other states also allow courts 
to take judicial notice of streets and buildings. See State v. 
Nelson, 543 So. 2d 1058 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1989); State v. Larsen, 
442 N.W.2d 840 (Minn. App. 1989); State v. Spain, 759 S.W.2d 871 
(Mo. App. 1988); People v. Hosney, 22 Cal. Rptr. 397 (Cal. App. 
1962) . 
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Flower relies on the holding of In re Phillips Estate, 44 
P. 2d 699 (Utah 1935), a probate case, for the proposition that 
judicial notice of an address is improper. However, he completely 
misstates the facts when he states, "The Supreme Court held that 
the trial court erred in taking judicial notice of the fact that 
University Avenue and Center Street are in Provo." (Appellant's 
Brief, p. 8.) In In re Phillips Estate, the Supreme Court was not 
setting aside judicial notice of a lower court. No trial court had 
taken judicial notice concerning the location of the streets. The 
Supreme Court was refusing to take judicial notice at the appellate 
stage of the proceedings. That is clearly not on point with the 
present case. The Supreme Court stated, "We cannot take judicial 
notice that these streets are in Provo or that they are actually 
within 80 yards of each other." (Emphasis added.) Instead, the 
Supreme Court remanded the case to the lower court for further 
proceedings. In re Phillips Estate, 444 P. 2d at 704, 705. In re 
Phillips Estate certainly does not prohibit a trial court from 
taking judicial notice of the location of an address. 
The trial court correctly took judicial notice at the time of 
trial that the address of 3596 West 3100 South is located within 
West Valley City. 
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POINT 2 
VENUE IS NOT AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF THE 
OFFENSE AND MAY BE ESTABLISHED BY 
CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE ON A PREPONDERANCE OF 
THE EVIDENCE STANDARD. 
In State v. Bailey, 282 P. 2d 339 (Utah 1955), the Utah Supreme 
Court ruled on a case very similar to the instant case. In Bailey, 
the witness testified that the offense (which was also "driving 
under the influence") had been committed at Roller Mill Hill, yet 
there was no direct proof that the offense was committed within 
Garfield County. The Supreme Court quoted an earlier case, State 
v. Mitchell, 278 P.2d 618 (Utah 1955), and stated: 
Some jurisdictions require that, in criminal 
cases, where venue is in issue, it must be 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt, and others 
by a preponderance. Some authorities, 
including this court, permit venue to be 
established inferentially by circumstantial 
evidence. We believe and hold that, however 
it is proved, it must be done by a 
preponderance of the evidence only and not 
beyond a reasonable doubt, since venue is not 
an element of the offense, and there seems to 
be no reason to require the same quantum and 
quality of proof to prove venue as is required 
to prove such elements. 
Mitchell, 278 P. 2d at 620. From the testimony presented in Bailey, 
the Supreme Court determined that it could reasonably be inferred 
that the offense was committed in Garfield County. Bailey, 282 
P.2d at 341. 
In addition, the Criminal Code clearly sets forth that venue 
is not part of the state's case and must only be established by a 
preponderance of the evidence. Section 76-1-501(3), U.C.A., 
states, "The existence of jurisdiction and venue are not elements 
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of the offense but shall be established by a preponderance of the 
evidence. " 
The judicial notice taken clearly meets the preponderance of 
evidence standard. See State v. Spain, 759 S.W.2d 871 (Mo. App. 
1988); People v. Hosney, 22 Cal. Rptr. 397 (Cal. App. 1962). In 
fact, in other jurisdictions which require that venue be proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt, courts have held that this higher 
standard was met by taking judicial notice of addresses and 
geographical locations. See State v. Larsen, 442 N.W.2d 840 (Minn. 
App. 1989); and State v. Williams, 474 So. 2d 23 (La. App. 2 Cir. 
1985) . 
POINT 3 
APPELLANT HAS WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO CONTEST 
VENUE, SINCE HE DID NOT OBJECT PRIOR TO TRIAL 
AS REQUIRED BY SECTION 76-1-202(2), U.C.A. 
Section 76-1-202(2), U.C.A.r states, "All objections to 
improper place of trial are waived by a defendant unless made 
before trial." Flower did not object to venue before trial. 
Therefore, Flower has waived his objection and cannot raise it on 
appeal. 
In considering the venue issue, the United States Supreme 
Court ruled that "the right to have a case heard in the court of 
the proper venue may be lost unless seasonably asserted." 
Industrial Addition Ass'n v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 323 
U.S. 310, 65 S. Ct. 289, 89 L. Ed. 260. Furthermore, the Utah 
Supreme Court has specifically held that Section 76-1-202(2), 
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U.C.A., applies to criminal defendants and that their failure to 
raise venue prior to trial waives their later objections. 
In State v. Lovell, 758 P. 2d 909 (Utah 1988), the court 
stated: 
Utah law requires that a defendant be tried in 
the county where the crime(s) occurred.2 
However, all objections of improper place of 
trial are waived by a defendant unless made 
before trial.3 In this case, defendant made no 
objection to venue, and therefore he waived 
any objection thereto. 
Lovell, 758 P.2d at 911. (Footnotes omitted.) See also State v. 
Dunbar, 665 P.2d 1273 (Utah 1983); State v. Cauble, 563 P.2d 775 
(Utah 1977) (the right to be tried in the county where the crime 
occurred "is a personal privilege which can be waived by failing to 
make a proper objection"). 
POINT 4 
SECTION 76-1-202(2), U.C.A., DOES NOT CONFLICT 
WITH SECTION 76-1-501(3), U.C.A., OR WITH DUE 
PROCESS REQUIREMENTS CONCERNING PROOF ON THE 
ISSUE OF VENUE. 
Section 76-1-202(2), U.C.A., and Section 76-1-501(3), U.C.A., 
are not in conflict. According to Section 76-1-202(2), U.C.A., a 
defendant waives any right to object that the place of trial is 
improper if venue is not contested before trial. Section 
76-1-501(3), U.C.A., requires that venue be established by a 
preponderance of the evidence. A defendant who questions if venue 
is proper can object. The prosecution must prove venue by a 
preponderance of the evidence. These two sections work in harmony 
with each other and set forth clear rules for the procedural 
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handling of venue issues. They clearly do not conflict, either on 
their face or in practice. 
Flower's assertion, that Section 76-1-202(2), U.C.A., 
functions as a virtual mandatory rebuttable presumption of guilt on 
the question of where an alleged offense occurred, is based upon 
the rationale that the location of trial relates to guilt. 
(Appellant's Brief, p. 5.) However, this assertion and rationale 
are erroneous. Venue does not determine guilt. Venue simply 
determines the place where the trial may or should be held. Venue 
does not determine whether the law has been violated. If the 
defendant contests venue and loses, his or her guilt is still not 
established. Similarly, if the defendant contests venue and wins, 
it does not establish his or her innocence. Section 76-1-202(2), 
U.C.A., pertains to procedure. It does not pertain to guilt. 
Furthermore, contrary to Flower's assertion, Section 
76-1-202(2), U.C.A., does not conflict with State v. Bailey, 282 
P.2d 339 (Utah 1955). (Appellant's Brief, p. 5.) In Bailey, the 
jury was given instruction that in order to find the defendant 
guilty of driving under the influence, it must find that the 
defendant's driving occurred in Garfield County as charged. From 
the testimony presented, the Supreme Court determined it could 
reasonably be inferred that the offense was committed in Garfield 
County. Bailey, 282 P.2d at 341. Section 76-1-202(2), U.C.A., 
does not relieve the prosecution from the burden of establishing 
where the offense occurred. But, as was found in Bailey, a 
preponderance of the evidence is the appropriate standard. 
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Section 76-1-202(2), U.C.A., and Section 76-1-501(3), U.C.A., 
clearly do not conflict. Flower's argument is based on the 
incorrect legal principle that the venue statute deals with guilt. 
POINT 5 
THE VENUE PROVISIONS IN SECTION 76-1-202(1), 
U.C.A., DO NOT RENDER SECTION 76-1-501(3), 
U.C.A., UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS VIOLATIVE OF THE 
REQUIREMENT THAT ALL OF THE FACTS CONSTITUTING 
A CRIME MUST BE PROVED BEYOND A REASONABLE 
DOUBT. 
The mandatory language of Section 76-1-202(1), U.C.A., 
provides that "criminal actions shall be tried in the county or 
district where the offense is alleged to have been committed." 
(Emphasis added.) In the present case, the information alleges 
that the offense was committed in West Valley City; thus the case 
was tried in the proper location. (R-16, 17; Exhibit C) 
Section 76-1-202(1), U.C.A., is a procedural section that 
deals with venue. It does not establish elements of crimes and 
there is no language in the section that even mentions element of 
crimes. Flower's assertion that the intent of the legislature was 
to make venue or proof of location of the crime an actual element 
of the case is simply unsupported. (Appellant's Brief, p. 6.) He 
is forced to make this unsupported assertion in order to find a way 
to argue that venue is an essential element of a criminal offense 
so that he can challenge the constitutionality of Sections 
76-1-202(1) and 76-1-501(3), U.C.A. Flower cites In re Wlnship, 
397 U.S. 358, 90 S. Ct. 1068, 25 L. Ed. 2d 368 (1970), to show that 
every fact necessary to constitute a crime must be proved beyond a 
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reasonable doubt. That proposition is certainly true; yet In re 
Wlnshlp is not applicable to venue, and thereon lies the fault with 
Flower's argument. Despite his assertion, it is without question 
that venue is not a fact necessary to prove the crime, as described 
in In re Wlnshlp, and that venue may be established by 
circumstantial evidence on a preponderance of the evidence 
standard. State v. Bailey, 282 P. 2d 339 (Utah 1955); State v. 
Mitchell, 278 P.2d 618 (Utah 1955); Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-501(3). 
Since venue is not an element of the offense, the due process 
protections, as articulated in In re Wlnshlp, are not violated. 
Indeed, the Constitution does not require that venue be proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt. See United States v. Turner, 586 F.2d 
395 (5th Cir. 1978), cert, denied, 440 U.S. 926, 99 S. Ct. 1258, 59 
L. Ed. 2d 480 (1979). Therefore, Section 76-1-501(3), U.C.A., 
clearly does not relieve the government from any constitutional 
burden. 
Much of Flower's argument is based upon what he thinks the 
Court of Appeals meant but failed to say in State v. Sorenson, 758 
P.2d 466 (Ut. App. 1988). Flower boldly states, "The only thing 
that kept the Court of Appeals from saying, in Sorenson, that the 
government must prove venue beyond a reasonable doubt is the 
'preponderance of the evidence' language in U.C.A. 76-1-501(3)." 
(Appellant's Brief, p. 6.) Contrary to Flower's assertion, the 
Court of Appeals did not even address venue. In Sorenson, the 
language of Section 76-1-501(3), U.C.A., was not in question. In 
fact, the Court of Appeals found that jurisdiction need not be 
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proved beyond a reasonable doubt, but, rather, by a preponderance 
of the evidence. Sorenson, 758 P . 2d at 470. The Court of Appeals' 
concern in Sorenson was that the state "put on absolutely no 
evidence of jurisdiction but relied instead entirely on the 
presumption that the consumption of alcohol occurred within the 
state." Sorenson, 758 P.2d at 470. The problem with such a 
presumption is that in the specific facts of that case, 
jurisdiction was bound up in a substantive element of the crime --
namely, possession or consumption of alcohol within the state of 
Utah in violation of state law. In that way, it became a 
presumption of guilt, thus creating a due process violation. 
However, the instant case is significantly distinguishable 
from Sorenson because venue, not jurisdiction, is in issue. In the 
instant case, there is no question that the Court of Appeals had 
jurisdiction.1 Also, no presumption concerning guilt is made in 
the case at hand. When objections to venue are waived, there still 
must be a trial to establish guilt. Section 76-1-501, U.C.A., does 
not make venue an essential element of the crime, since the place 
of trial does not affect the question of the defendant's guilt. 
Consequently, Section 76-1-202(2), U.C.A., in no way shifts the 
burden of proving guilt from the prosecution to the defendant. 
It is clear that Section 76-1-202(1), U.C.A., does not render 
Section 76-1-501(3), U.C.A., violative of the standard articulated 
in In re Wlnship that every fact necessary to constitute the crime 
In the case at hand, the charge was a violation of Section 41-6-44, U.C.A., "Driving under the 
influence of alcohol," and Section 41-6-45, U.C.A., "Reckless driving." Both charges are misdemeanors which 
are unquestionably within the jurisdiction of the circuit courts of this state to try. 
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need be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Flower's argument is 
based on unsupported assumptions and should be disregarded. Venue 
is not an element of an offense and can be proved by a 
preponderance of the evidence. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons advanced above, judicial notice was properly 
taken by the trial court establishing venue by a preponderance of 
the evidence, and the trial court's denial of Defendant's Motion 
for Order Arresting Judgment should be affirmed in all respects. 
DATED this f£) day of July, 1993. 
WEST VALLEY CITY 
".\ Richard Catten 
Attorney for Appellee 
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Exhibit A 
PART 2 
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 
76-1-202. Venue of actions. 
(1) Criminal actions shall be tried in the county or district where the of-
fense is alleged to have been committed. In determining the proper place of 
trial, the following provisions shall apply: 
(a) If the commission of an offense commenced outside the state is 
consummated within this state, the offender shall be tried in the county 
where the offense is consummated. 
(b) When conduct constituting elements of an offense or results tha t 
constitute elements, whether the conduct or result constituting elements 
is, in itself, unlawful, shall occur in two or more counties, trial of the 
offense may be held in any of the counties concerned. 
(c) If a person committing an offense upon the person of another is 
located in one county and his victim is located in another county at the 
time of the commission of the offense, trial may be held in either county. 
(d) If a cause of death is inflicted in one county and death ensues in 
another county, the offender may be tried in either county. 
(e) A person who commits an inchoate offense may be tried in any 
county in which any act that is an element of the offense, including the 
agreement in conspiracy, is committed. 
(f) Where a person in one county solicits, aids, abets, agrees, or at-
tempts to aid another in the planning or commission of an offense in 
another county, he may be tried for the offense in either county. 
(g) When an offense is committed within this state and it cannot be 
readily determined in which county or district the offense occurred, the 
following provisions shall be applicable: 
(i) When an offense is committed upon any railroad car, vehicle, 
watercraft, or aircraft passing within this state, the offender may be 
tried in any county through which such railroad car, vehicle, water-
craft, or aircraft has passed. 
(ii) When an offense is committed on any body of water bordering 
on or within this state, the offender may be tried in any county 
adjacent to such body of water. The words "body of water" shall in-
clude but not be limited to any stream, river, lake, or reservoir, 
whether natural or man-made. 
(iii) A person who commits theft may be tried in any county in 
which he exerts control over the property affected. 
(iv) If an offense is committed on or near the boundary of two or 
more counties, trial of the offense may be held in any of such coun-
ties. 
(v) For any other offense, trial may be held in the county in which 
the defendant resides, or, if he has no fixed residence, in the county in 
which he is apprehended or to which he is extradited. 
(2) All objections of improper place of trial are waived by a defendant un-
less made before trial. 
Exhibit B 
ARTICLE II. 
JUDICIAL NOTICE. 
Rule 201. Judicial notice of adjudicative facts. 
(a) Scope of rule. This rule governs only judicial notice cf adjudicative 
facts. 
(b) Kinds of facts. A judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to 
reasonable dispute in that it is either (1) generally known within the territo-
rial jurisdiction of the trial court or (2) capable of accurate and ready determi-
nation by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned. 
(c) When discretionary. A court may take judicial notice, whether re-
quested or not. 
(d) When mandatory. A court shall take judicial notice if requested by a 
party and supplied with the necessary information. 
(e) Opportunity to be heard. A party is entitled upon timely request to an 
opportunity to be heard as to the propriety of taking judicial notice and the 
tenor of the matter noticed. In the absence of prior notification, the request 
may be made after judicial notice has been taken. 
if) Time of taking not ice. Judicial notice may be taken at any stage of the 
proceeding. 
(g) Ins t ruc t ing j u r y . In a civil action or proceeding, the court shall in-
struct the jury to accept as conclusive any fact judicially noticed. In a criminal 
case, the court shall instruct the jury that it may. but is not required to, accept 
as conclusive any fact judicially noticed. 
Exhibit C 
Keith L. Stoney (3868) 
City Prosecutor 
West Valley City 
3600 Constitution Boulevard 
West Valley City, UT 84119 
(801) 963-3331 
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, WEST VALLEY DEPARTMENT 
STATE OF UTAH (WVC) 
Plaintiff, 
FLOWER, GROVER LAWRENCE 
4256 SOUTH WHIPORWHOOL ST 
WVC, UTAH 84120 
6/30/61 
Defendant. 
I N F O R M A T I O N 
Case No. 925013jfoiTC 
The undersigned, KEITH L. STONEY, under oath, states on 
information and belief that the defendant, on or about 15 NOVEMBER, 
1992, at the vicinity of 3596 WEST 3100 SOUTH, West Valley City, 
Utah, did unlawfully commit the crime(s) of: 
COUNT Is DUI, a Class "B" Misdemeanor, 41-6-44, U.C.A. 1953, as 
amended, by driving or being in actual physical control 
of a vehicle while having a blood or breath alcohol 
content of .08% or greater by weight or while under the 
influence of alcohol or drugs. 
COUNT 2: RECKLESS DRIVING, a Class B Misdemeanor, 41-6-45, U.C.A. 
1953, as amended, by operating any vehicle in willful or 
wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property. 
This information is based on evidence obtained from the 
following witnesses: 
OFFICER 
OFFICER 
CHAD M. 
COLLEEN 
KEITH D. 
TROOPER 
BLACK 
SANDQUIST 
PETERSEON 
HANSEN 
LAYTON 
MCGREGOR 
PROBABLE CAUSE STATEMENT: 
Your affiant bases this information on the following: 
WITNESSES STATE THAT THE DEFENDANT drove or was in actual physical 
control of a vehicle while having a blood or breath alcohol content 
of .08% or greater by weight, or while under the influence of 
alcohol or any drug or the combined influence of alcohol and any 
drug to a degree which rendered the defendant incapable of safely 
driving said vehicle; DEFENDANT OPERATED HIS MOTOR VEHICLE WITH 
WILLFUL OR WANTON DISREGARD FOR THE PROPERTY OR SAFETY OF OTHERS. . 
Complainant 
92020636, MG, FLOWER.G 
PTC: 8 JANUARY, 1992, 9:00 A.M. 
January 8, 1993 
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J. Richard Catten (#4291) 
Senior Attorney 
WEST VALLEY CITY 
36 00 Constitution Boulevard 
West Valley City, Utah 84119 
(801)963-3271 
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, WEST VALLEY DEPARTMENT 
STATE OF UTAH (WVC), 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
GROVE L. FLOWER, 
Defendant• 
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND 
ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
FOR ORDER ARRESTING JUDGMENT 
Case No. 925013701 TC 
Judge William A. Thome 
Defendant Grove L. Flower having presented a Motion for Order 
Arresting Judgment pursuant to Rule 23 of the Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, the Court received written memoranda in support 
and in opposition to the Motion. The parties also appeared before 
the Court in oral argument on the Motion on February 18, 1993, with 
Robert B. Breeze appearing for the Defendant and J. Richard Catten 
appearing for the prosecuting agency, West Valley City. The Court, 
upon review of the pleadings, memoranda, affidavits, authorities, 
and arguments of the parties, and being fully advised in the 
premises, hereby makes and enters the following findings of fact, 
conclusions of law, and order with respect to Defendant's Motion 
for Order Arresting Judgment. 
to 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Defendant was charged, by Information, with violation of 
Section 41-6-44, Utah Code Annotated (UCA), "Driving under the 
influence of alcohol," and Section 41-6-45, UCA, "Reckless 
driving." 
2. The matter was heard as a bench trial in the Third 
Circuit Court, West Valley Department, on January 13, 1993, before 
the Honorable William A. Thome. 
3. Two witnesses were presented by the prosecution — 
Colleen Hansen, a private citizen, and Officer Black, a West Valley 
City Police Department Patrol Officer. The defense presented no 
witnesses. 
4. At the conclusion of the presentation of evidence and 
arguments, the Court found the Defendant guilty of driving under 
the influence of alcohol and not guilty of reckless driving. 
5. On or about January 21, 1993, Defendant filed a Motion 
for Order Arresting Judgment and accompanying affidavits, pursuant 
to Rule 23 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
6. On or about February 9, 1993, Plaintiff filed a Response 
to Motion for Order Arresting Judgment. 
7. At oral argument on February 18, 1993, the parties 
stipulated on the record, and the Court finds the following: 
a. Neither witness directly testified that the offense 
of driving under the influence occurred within the 
limits of West Valley City. 
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b. Witness Hansen testified that the offense occurred 
at her place of employment, which was located at 
3596 West 3100 South. 
8. The Court is familiar with the location of the address of 
3596 West 3100 South and knows it to be within West Valley City 
limits. The address is unique, and there is not another 3596 West 
3100 South within Salt Lake County. The Court further finds that 
3596 West 3100 South is not located near the border of West Valley 
City or any other jurisdiction; but, rather, is located near the 
center of West Valley City. 
9. The address of 3596 West 3100 South is generally known 
within the territorial jurisdiction of the Court to be within West 
Valley City. 
10. The Court, based upon the address evidence presented by 
Witness Hansen, took judicial notice at the time of the trial that 
the address of 3596 West 3100 South is located within West Valley 
City. The Court gave little weight to the evidence that the 
arresting officer was a West Valley City officer. 
11. The Court, at the time of the trial, did not luaku aoLo or 
place on the record that the Court had taken judicial notice that 
the address was within West Valley City. 
3 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Rule 201 of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides that a 
court may take judicial notice of adjudicative facts wnich are not 
subject to reasonable dispute and which are generally known within 
the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court. 
2. It is not subject to reasonable dispute that the address 
of 3596 West 3100 South is generally known within the territorial 
jurisdiction of the Court as being within West Valley City limits. 
ORDER 
Based upon the foregoing, Defendant's Motion for Order 
Arresting Judgment is denied. 
DATED this ^^7 day of Z2^'-+~ C—^ , 1993. 
William A/ Thorne • 
Third Circuit Court Judge 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Robert B. Br^Rg_r ftsg. 
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